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Abstract
We investigate the norm of just deserts and its effect on honesty. Just deserts is an
essential norm in a market society, and honesty is an important factor in economic and
social exchange. In particular, we analyze what happens when the social distributive
rules betray the reasonable expectation that who deserves more will obtain a larger pay-
off. Using a formal-theoretic framework—equity theory—we explore the nexus between
the perception of just deserts and honesty, combining cross-national survey (WVS)
evidence and data from two laboratory experiments—conducted in the United States
and Italy—to study whether violations of the principle of just deserts contribute to an
increased tolerance for or an engagement in dishonest and corrupt acts. We find con-
vergent evidence that violation of the just deserts norm results in a greater propensity
toward self-serving dishonesty, and that this effect is distinct from the effect of inequal-
ity. Both the survey and experimental results also indicate that sensitivity to violations
of the just deserts norm vary cross-nationally. We conclude with a discussion of the
implications of our results for theories of distributive justice and multiple equilibria in
societal levels of honesty.
JEL-Classification: C91, D03, D31, D63, H26
Keywords: Meritocracy, Equity, Honesty, Just Deserts, Cross-country Experiment, World
Values Survey
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“If people feel that they are taken
advantage of, why should they not rip
off the system in return?”
— Elster, Solomonic Judgements
“Justice is a curious mixture of equality
within inequality.”
— Homans, Social behavior: Its
Elementary Forms
1 Introduction: Honesty and Just Deserts
Norms play a crucial role in the functioning of any socio-economic system. In particular
the norms of trust and honesty are important norms for economic, political and legal devel-
opment (Guiso et al., 2008; Uslaner, 2008; Rose-Ackerman, 2001a; Rothstein and Uslaner,
2005; Rose-Ackerman, 2001b; Zak and Knack, 2001) as they reduce the riskiness of market
transactions in a world of uncertainty and incomplete contracts (Robert and Arnab, 2013).
While trust and honesty help facilitate market exchange, a market economy paradigmati-
cally relies on a meritocratic norm—henceforth meritocratic equity or just deserts—to give
legitimacy to the inequality of the distribution of income in society. The presumption of this
norm is that one deserves the income one has, as a function of merit1. While the belief in
the extent to which just deserts should play a role in the distribution of income within a so-
ciety varies across individuals in large part as a function of political ideology (Lewin-Epstein
et al., 2003; d’Anjou et al., 1995; Mitchell et al., 2003), and context (Scott and Bornstein,
2009), most individuals in advanced industrial societies support the principle of merit as
one (perhaps among several) criterion in decisions regarding distributive justice (Scott et al.,
2001; Kunovich and Slomczynski, 2007). The fact that it is a norm suggests that it might
also vary across cultures—indeed even among advanced industrialized market economies the
1As pointed out by Sen (2000), the principle of merit is instrumental and its definition contingent on our
view of a good society (which in turn defines which activities are good and which actions are right). The
practice of rewarding merit being underdefined, it needs to draw on other normative theories to get a precise
content. We define merit as productivity (the result of skill plus effort), adopting the economic approach
of rewarding merit on the basis of consequences: actions are to be rewarded for the good they do, so that
incentives are well defined to produce a better and more efficient society in the long run.
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support for the principle of just deserts may vary substantially (Kunovich and Slomczynski,
2007; Osberg and Smeeding, 2006; Svallfors, 1997; Kelley and Evans, 1993; Gijsberts, 2002).
In this study, we investigate the relationship between these norms—honesty on the one
hand, and just deserts on the other. Our principal hypothesis—based on equity theory
(Adams, 1963, 1965)—is that violations of the norm of just deserts can have a deleterious
effect on honesty, inducing those who feel that the system is inequitable, to “rip it off” in
turn. To investigate whether (actual and perceived) violations of the principle of just deserts
increase the propensity toward dishonesty, we use the following two-part empirical strategy.
First, drawing on data from the World Values Survey, we investigate whether a belief that
“success in life is generally the result of luck and connections” is significantly correlated with
a willingness to justify a number of corrupt or dishonest acts.2 This approach lends external
validity in the form of a multinational, representative survey and allows us to establish that
such association exists as a general predisposition across a large number of populations. In
this multilevel analysis we are able to control for potentially confounding variables related
to inequality at both the country level (observed income distribution, measured by the Gini
index) and individual level (preferences for egalitarianism), and we find that the effect of just
deserts is significant and substantial, over and above the effect of equality-related variables.
However, due to the limitations of cross-national survey data, we can neither establish
causality within this relationship nor test whether this predisposition can manifest itself as
behavior when dishonesty is an option to reduce inequitable payoffs that involve real money.
In order to do so, we introduce a controlled, earned-income laboratory experiment in both
the United States and Italy. We conduct the experiment in these two different locations
to also investigate whether different industrial societies—in our case, American and Italian
subjects—react differently to the norms of just deserts and honesty. This might be indeed
the case as Americans seem to believe more strongly in the principle of just deserts than
Italian and have an income distribution which is more reflective of the just deserts principle
(Kunovich and Slomczynski, 2007). The first stage of the experiment is a real-effort task,
in which we manipulate the degrees of equity and inequality of the reward (the income
assignment procedure). We then pair high performing subjects with low performing subjects,
allowing the high-performers to record the outcomes of a series of private signals in which
a misrepresentation of the signals can materially benefit the high-performer at the expense
of the low-performer. High-performing but rule-disadvantaged subjects in the inequitable
conditions are more likely to be dishonest in such a way that earns them income at the
expense of their randomly matched low-performing partner. This experimental design brings
2We use a single act—income tax evasion—for the purposes of illustration, but the relationship holds
across eight different items which ask about different types of dishonest and corrupt acts.
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together two growing trends in experimental economics: “dishonesty” experiments, the vast
majority of which follow the paradigm laid out in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), and
real-effort experiments, in which income (or a privileged role) is “earned” by performance on
a quiz or task embedded in the experiment (Hoffman et al., 1994; Ruﬄe, 1998; Rutström
and Williams, 2000; Jakiela, 2011; Esarey et al., 2012; Balafoutas et al., 2013; Durante et al.,
2013).
As a result of this two-pronged empirical strategy, we uncover convergent evidence that
the violation of the principle of just deserts increases dishonesty and corruption. This empir-
ical strategy gives us more confidence in the generalizability of our causal inferences by virtue
of the external validity of the nationally representative survey complementing the internal
validity of the lab experiment. As such, we can conclude that the justification of dishonesty
as a result of perceived lack of just deserts is both a general predisposition and a behavioral
tendency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the literature
focusing in particular on the way merit has been operationalized in experimental studies. In
section 3 we formalize the theoretic framework. In section 4, we present the cross-national
survey evidence of the attitudinal link between perceptions of unjust deserts and toleration of
dishonesty and corruption. In section 5, we operationalize this relationship in the incentivized
lab experiment. Section 6 discusses the broader implications of our findings and concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is extensive evidence from experimental economics that individuals care not only
about the nature of the final distribution of income but also about the procedures that
brought it about (e.g. Frey et al., 2004; Jakiela, 2011; Hoffman et al., 1994; Almås et al.,
2010; Dal Bó et al., 2010; Konow, 2000, 1996; Rabin, 1993; Bolton et al., 2005). There
are numerous theoretical and empirical studies of meritocracy in the behavioral economic
tradition, with a number of theoretical conceptions of merit-based equity having been put
forth, often combined with experimental tests.
Konow (1996, 2000) develops the “accountability principle” in which individuals are to
be held responsible for outcomes under their control but not for factors outside of their
control. Ooghe et al. (2007) and Schokkaert and Devooght (2003) develop a largely simi-
lar concept they call “responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism”. Cappelen et al. (2010, 2007)
manipulate the sources of rewards (i.e., whether they are earned or a result of luck) to test
meta-preferences for equity, such as strict egalitarianism, libertarianism and liberal egali-
tarianism, the latter of which is functionally equivalent to Konow’s accountability principle.
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Though they find heterogeneous preferences among their experimental subjects, there is a
preponderance of “liberal egalitarians.” Almås et al. (2010), demonstrate, through the use of
a modified dictator game, that acceptance of equitable inequality (i.e. inequality generated
by differential returns to effort and achievement) tends to develop during early adolescence.
This study is based on an experimental design in which subjects first engage in a production
phase where they can spend their time either working at a task (counting the appearance of
certain numbers on a screen) or engaging in unproductive activity such as watching cartoons.
Taken together, these results demonstrate that just deserts is among the most important cri-
teria for establishing the equitability of income distributions. Our study builds on these to
investigate the link between (un)just deserts and dishonesty.
In the laboratory, meritocracy is typically operationalized by assigning initial endowments
and/or experimental roles based on performance on a task or quiz embedded within the
experiment. In these designs high performance is rewarded with either a larger endowment
or a (presumably) more privileged experimental role (if the experiment calls for heterogeneous
roles). This condition is then typically contrasted with a condition in which the endowments
or roles are randomly assigned. Among the first to use quizzes and/or tasks—as opposed
to chance—to assign roles and/or initial endowments in an experimental setting, Hoffman
et al. (1994) find that assigning the role of proposer in the Ultimatum game based on
high performance on a quiz, causes responders to accept more unequal income allocations.
Burrows and Loomes (1994) find that whether group income was earned or randomly assigned
affects behavior in bargaining over the final allocation of payments. Ruﬄe (1998) finds that
in ultimatum and dictator games proposers reward the effort that recipients put forth in an
experimental task.
Other studies focus on the role of earned and unearned income in redistribution exper-
iments. Durante et al. (2013) find that there is a reduced demand for redistribution of
unequal incomes if this inequality is generated by performance on a “knowledge quiz,” and
that men are more prone to respond to such considerations. Rutström and Williams (2000)
however, find that if the choice regarding redistribution is given to the subjects after they
have earned their money, then preferences for redistribution more or less conform to what
would be expected of purely selfish utility maximizers, that is, those with higher incomes
support less redistribution and those with lower incomes prefer more distribution, and these
preferences do not significantly differ even if the income differentials are unearned. Bal-
afoutas et al. (2013) investigate the effect of equity and inequality considerations on the
voluntary contribution mechanism with a redistribution scheme (either exogenously given or
voted into place by the subjects). Their mechanism for earning income is also a quiz, but,
unlike Rutström and Williams (2000), they find that subjects are more keen on redistribu-
6
Just Deserts & Dishonesty Kline, Galeotti & Orsini
tion when income differences are the result of luck. Großer and Reuben (2013) find that
even when income is earned in a double auction and subjects can vote on the level of re-
distribution, they nonetheless favor significant redistribution. Esarey et al. (2012) find that
political ideology is associated with a willingness to redistribute unearned income, but not
earned income. Using modified dictator games with earned and unearned income, Jakiela
(2011) finds that standard American experimental subjects are more likely to reward effort
as opposed to luck, while Kenyan villagers do not display this tendency.
Drawing more heavily on the Rawlsian tradition, a number of Political Science studies
(Michelbach et al., 2003; Scott et al., 2001; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1992, 1990) find
that multiple motives, including merit and maximin preferences drive distributive prefer-
ences, these include both incentivized and unincentivized experiments. Also invoking Rawls,
Krawczyk (2010) finds that there are lower levels of redistribution when income is earned in
a task than when it is random, though he finds that inequality of opportunity (as measured
by a-priori probabilities of winning) does not affect levels of redistribution.
Studies of “organizational justice” investigate the equity of selection, evaluation and com-
pensation procedures within organizations (Gilliland, 1993; Greenberg, 1987). Especially
interesting for our theme of inequity and its effect on dishonesty, Greenberg (1990) find that
employee theft increases after unexpected pay cuts.
This large, interdisciplinary literature offers considerable evidence that just deserts is an
important, though not exclusive, determinant of distributive preferences, and that it can
be meaningfully operationalized and manipulated in the lab. An additional literature has
developed around the use of survey data to study distributional preferences in a cross-national
setting, and suggests that there are substantial within- and between-nation differences in
the extent to which individuals perceive the income distribution in their society as being
meritocratically fair (Fong, 2001; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005a,b; Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005). In this research, cross-national variation in these perceptions explains substantial
variation in aggregate preferences for redistribution.
In addition to the research, both experimental and observational, that pertains to just
deserts, there is a rapidly growing literature on the behavioral economics of cheating and
dishonesty. Most germane to our own design is a literature that has grown out of a paradigm
developed in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). In this paradigm, subjects roll a die in
private, the outcome of which determines their earnings (and/or the earnings of another
subject) in one way or another. The subjects, however, are free to misreport the outcome
of the die roll. Researchers are then able to determine whether certain outcomes of the die
roll are observed with greater frequency than others. What is often observed is that while
subjects, in the aggregate, do misrepresent the outcome, they do not do so in a way which
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maximizes their earnings. This paradigm has, in a short time, generated a large amount of
literature (Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011; Shalvi et al., 2011; Suri et al.,
2011; Shalvi et al., 2012; López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2012, among many others). The work
by Francesca Gino and others (Gino and Pierce, 2009, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2011) is closer to
ours in terms of its theoretical content as they all involve evaluations of equity theory. Where
our design differs is in that its focus is on the manipulation of the income generating process
as a function of performance on a real-effort task embedded in the experiment. Moreover, in
these studies the effect of dishonesty on the part of the evaluator is such that the interests
of the evaluator and the evaluated are aligned, whereas in our experiment, the effect of
dishonesty is zero sum.
Finally, though it does not involve earned income manipulations, Houser et al. (2012)
is also close to the spirit to our experimental design. They find that subjects who were
given a small allocation in a dictator game (implemented with the strategy method) are
more likely to (self-servingly) cheat when reporting the outcome of a subsequent coin flip,
thereby increasing their total payoff. They posit that the increase in dishonest behavior is
a result of a perceived violation of the egalitarian equity norm. We believe that dishonesty
can result from perceived violations of other equity norms, in particular the norm of just
deserts. However, because egalitarianism has also been shown to be an important criterion
for evaluating distributive justice, we are careful to control for inequality in both the survey
and experimental designs and analyses.
3 Equity Theory
“Equity theory” (Adams, 1965, 1963) motivates our hypotheses, our statistical modeling
and our experimental design. According to equity theory, an individual evaluates the fairness
of a given context by comparing the ratio of their own outcomes and inputs with the ratio
of outcomes to inputs of another individual who serves as a reference point for interpersonal
comparisons of equity.3 Unequal ratios cause the individual distress, which can be then be
attenuated through a variety of mechanisms, including the modification of inputs and/or
outputs (Gino and Pierce, 2009). In Adams’ theory, inputs are broadly construed, and
consist of “the participant’s contributions to the exchange, which are seen as entitling him
to rewards or costs”, which in turn constitute the outcomes. Outcomes are typically (but
3Later reformulations of equity theory include, among others, an ordinal formulation (Moschetti, 1979).
Adams’ original formulation, however imperfect as a general theory (see Walster et al., 1973; Harris, 1976;
Alessio, 1980; Huseman et al., 1987, for extensions and criticisms of the original theory), is more than
adequate for our purposes.
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not necessarily) defined in monetary terms (as they are in this study).4
Gino and Pierce (2009, 2010) and Ayal and Gino (2011) investigate dishonesty as a mech-
anism for reducing the distress arising from inequity. However, due to the random assignment
of roles and initial payments, the income assignment mechanism is not a function of merit.
While these studies are closely related to ours, our work is, to the best of our knowledge, the
first application of equity theory to the relationship betweenmeritocratic equity (just deserts)
and honesty. In our cross-national survey analysis, we investigate individual tolerance for
the dishonest modification of outcomes as a function of individual’s beliefs regarding just
deserts. In our experiment, by directly manipulating meritocratic equity through the initial
assignment of income based on relative performance on a real effort task, we test whether
violations of meritocratic equity cause an increased behavioral propensity for the dishonest
modification of outputs. To the extent that meritocratic equity is violated (or perceived to
be violated), we hypothesize that we will observe a greater tolerance of or propensity toward
the dishonest modification of outputs.
An equitable scenario (between persons A and B) is one in which the ratios of outcomes
to inputs for both persons are equal. Formally, it is defined as:
OA/IA = OB/IB (1)
where Oi and Ii are, respectively, the outcomes and inputs of individual i = {A,B}.
For example, imagine a scenario in which there are two hourly workers working on the
same job in the same company. In the case where one worker works twice as many hours as
the other, it is almost axiomatic that the former should be paid twice as much as the latter
in order for the situation to be equitable, because these are the respective outcomes (wages)
that, given the inputs (hours worked), would ensure equality between the two workers’ ratios
of outcomes to inputs. Conversely, inequity arises when these ratios are not equal, i.e. when
OA/IA > OB/IB or OA/IA < OB/IB. In our experiment, we manipulate the values of OA and OB
across treatments by varying payments in the real effort task as a function of performance
(which is dichotomized as “high”—above the median—and “low”—below the median).
For our purposes, assume that person B is the decision maker—that is, the individual
who may take a dishonest action to reduce his distress caused by inequity. We can normalize
his inputs such that IB = 1, and then solve for the value of IA that equalizes the two ratios.
4It has been pointed out that equity theory, with its focus on contributions (inputs) represents only one of
several possible distributional rules (Leventhal, 1976). Indeed, inter alia equality and need are often invoked
as distributional criteria. Nonetheless, these criteria are not mutually exclusive (Scott et al., 2001; Michelbach
et al., 2003). We control for equality in our regressions and through our experimental design. Given that
our experimental subjects (in both locations) consist of undergraduate students who are randomly allocated
to different treatments, beliefs that need among the subjects is heterogeneous are likely to be minimal.
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We will denote the value of IA that equalizes the equity ratios as I∗A. Because we normalize
IB = 1, then I∗A = OA/OB. When IA = I∗A, the scenario is equitable. Conversely, when
IA 6= I∗A, the scenario is inequitable. There are different combinations of inputs and outputs
that produce an equitable or inequitable scenario. These combinations are summarized in
Table 1 where we also indicate whether the final distribution of the outputs is equal or
unequal.
Table 1: Equitable and Inequitable scenarios
Scenario Inputs Outputs Inequity Inequality
1 IB ≥ IA OA > OB Negative Yes
2 IB > IA OA = OB Negative No
3 IB > IA OA < OB Either Yes
4 IB = IA OA = OB None No
5 IB < IA OA > OB Either Yes
6 IB < IA OA = OB Positive No
7 IB ≤ IA OA < OB Positive Yes
Note: Negative inequity is disadvantageous for the decision
maker (Person B), while positive inequity is advantageous.
In Scenario 1 (as well as Scenario 7), we group together sit-
uations where IB is strictly greater (smaller) than IA with
situations where IB is equal to IA. This is because, within
the equity theory framework, they are qualitatively identical
(i.e. the predictions of the theory go in the same direction).
As Bloom (1999) points out, negative or disadvantageous inequity (which characterizes
Scenarios 1, 2, and, potentially, 3) has a much stronger effect than positive or advantageous
inequity on the behavior of the subject who has to evaluate the distribution and eventually
take action. For this reason, in our experimental study, we focus on scenarios where the
input of Person B (the decision maker) is greater than the input of Person A. More precisely,
in our experiment, we only consider the first four Scenarios, with Scenario 4 as baseline.
Hence we restrict here our analysis to Scenarios 1-4.5 Since IB = 1 and I∗A = OA/OB, a
scenario is always inequitable when IA ≤ 1 < I∗A (Scenario 1), IA < 1 = I∗A (Scenario 2)
or when IA > I∗A>1 (Scenario 3). A scenario is always equitable (Scenario 3 and 4) when
IA = I
∗
A = 1. Note that Scenario 3 can be equitable or inequitable depending on the value
of IA relative to I∗A.
In our experiment, the only information about inputs that is available to subjects is the
performance ranking.6 Hence, the subjects know whether IA is larger, smaller or equal to
5The opposite situations, where the input of the evaluator and decision maker (Person B) is lower than
the input of the other subject (Person A) might be worth of study too. The experimental analysis of these
scenarios is left for future research.
6It is possible, of course, that subjects will have unobserved heterogeneity in beliefs regarding the ultimate
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IB. We can then use I∗A as a measure of how much the performance of Person A would
have to be differentially valued in order for the scenario to be equitable. The value of
the I∗A parameter allows us to make predictions regarding the relative propensity toward
dishonesty of Person B (who in our experiment is designated the “Custodian”) in the various
treatments. If I∗A > IA, the scenario’s outcomes (i.e., payoffs) privilege A’s inputs over B’s
inputs, whereas if I∗A < IA, the scenario’s outcomes privilege B’s inputs over those of A.
Equity theory therefore predicts that selfish dishonesty (i.e. dishonesty which benefits B at
the expense of A) may occur in the first case, whereas altruistic dishonesty (i.e. dishonesty
on the part of B that benefits A at the expense of B) may occur in the second case. Below,
we use the value of I∗A in each treatment to inform our hypotheses about the observed levels
of dishonesty across treatments.
4 A Cross-National Multilevel analysis of Just Deserts, Dishonesty
and Corruption
In this section, we investigate the effect of the just deserts of the income distribution
on the propensity to tolerate or justify dishonest and corrupt acts. We conduct a multi-
level (MLM) regression analysis of survey data consisting of more than 130,000 individual
observations. Such a technique enables us to model cross-country variation of the explana-
tory variable resulting in a less noisy estimation of the relationship of interest. We employ a
random-intercepts model to account for such variation. The use of MLM allows us to control
for country-specific effects while simultaneously including country-level and individual-level
attributes as independent variables. Such flexibility is important as the dataset we use for the
individual level data—the World Values Survey (Inglehart, 1998)—consists of several hun-
dred survey items administered in nearly 100 countries encompassing hundreds of thousands
of respondents. A multilevel model can allow us to fully exploit all of this cross-national
variation to obtain an efficient estimate of the association between variables at an individual
level. MLM offers a middle ground between “complete pooling, in which differences between
groups are ignored, and no pooling, in which data from difference sources are analyzed sep-
arately.” (Gelman and Hill, 2007, p. 7). Such a middle ground produces more efficient
parameter estimates than would a country random effects model.
We first test our hypothesis that tolerance of dishonesty and corruption is positively
source of any such performance differences. Nonetheless, such heterogeneity should not pose a problem for
us given the randomization of our experimental design. Unlike in the real world, our design makes very
transparent both the inputs and the outcomes of the scenario, therefore allowing for a clean test of the
theory.
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associated with the perception of unjust deserts of the income distribution. In addition, we
demonstrate that this association is robust to the inclusion of several important covariates,
most importantly including measures of inequality aversion and country-level inequality.
4.1 Data
In the political economy literature there is a standard WVS item that is used to capture the
notion of “just deserts”7 which asks subjects to express their agreement with the statement
“hard work brings success” on a scale from 1-10, where 1 represents close agreement (“Hard
work usually brings a better life.”), and 10 represents strong disagreement (“Hard work
doesn’t generally bring success—it’s more a matter of luck and connections.”). Just deserts
is our proxy for “perceived meritocracy” and as such it is the chief explanatory variable
for all of our models. Our dependent variable asks respondents to rate, on a scale of 1-
10, whether “cheating on taxes if you have a chance” is “never justifiable” (1) or “always
justifiable” (10). Our main behavioral hypothesis is that the coefficient on the just deserts
variable should be positive and highly significant. In addition to this item, there are 8
additional items that relate to other dishonest or corrupt activities. These are all measured
on the same scale of “justifiability”, asking to what extent “claiming undeserved government
benefits”, “avoiding a fare on public transport”, “joyriding”, “lying”, “paying cash to avoid
taxes”, “buying stolen goods”, “keeping money you have found” and “failing to report damage
you’ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle” are justifiable activities. The relationship
between just deserts and the justification of the dishonest/corrupt act is remarkably robust
across all of these various conceptualizations of dishonesty/corruption. Here we focus on
the “taxes” item, but the overall effects are virtually identical irrespective of which of these
dependent variables we use. Some of the results from these other models are available in the
supplementary appendix.
We include three other relevant survey items (individual level variables) as controls: the
first gives a self-reported measure of the respondent’s household income, measured in ten
steps with a higher step representing a higher income. Note that these are not income deciles,
but rather ranges of (self-reported) income. Second is a measure of trust which takes values
of 1, corresponding to “Most people can be trusted” and 2, corresponding to “Can’t be too
careful.” Finally we include a variable which measures respondents’ views on income equality
by asking on a range of 1 to 10, whether “income should be made more equal” (1) or “we
need larger income differences as incentives” (10). There are any number of country level
variables that one might think it is useful to include in a model, however, here we opt for a
parsimonious statistical specification, which includes only three country level predictors. We
7See, inter alia, Fong (2001); Bénabou and Tirole (2006); Alesina and Giuliano (2009); Alesina et al.
(2001); Alesina and Glaeser (2004); Alesina and Angeletos (2005b); Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
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include GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms, taken from World Bank’s WDI
database; a measure of the country’s income inequality (Gini coefficient), a number from
0-100 with higher levels representing greater inequality; and a measure of corruption at the
country level taken from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),
taking values from 0-10, with higher values representing less pervasive corruption.
Using the combined five waves of the World Values survey, we have a dataset including
84 countries, and 131,691 individual observations with a minimum of 298 and a maximum
of 4,907 per country.
4.2 Multilevel regression analysis
Our variable of interest—(un)just deserts, that is, the higher the value, the less meritocrat-
ically equitable the respondent views the income generating process—captures the belief
that within ones system, even if one works hard and plays by the rules, one still cannot “get
ahead.” We expect that there should exist a positive relationship between a belief in (un)just
deserts and our dependent variable.
In a multilevel model, there are two (or more) levels of analysis. Here, we distinguish
between the individual (level 1) and the country in which the individual resides (level 2).
Results from LR test for a model with the constant only and intra-correlation class suggest
that there is a significant amount of cross-country variation to explain and justify the use of
a multilevel model.8
We thus estimate the following random intercept model:9
taxevasionij = γ00 + γ10 ∗ hardworkij + γ20 ∗ equalityij + γ30 ∗ trustij + γ40 ∗ incomeij
+ γ01 ∗ ginij + γ02 ∗ cpij + γ03 ∗ gdpj + eij + u0j (2)
where hardwork, equality, trust and income are level-1 variables, and Gini, CPI and GDP
are level-2 variables.
8What we are interested in is whether there are cross-country differences in tolerance of tax evasion and
the relative size of these differences compared to the difference across individuals. The likelihood ratio test
provides us with an answer to the first question. That is, the likelihood ratio test holds as a null hypothesis
that the random effects ANOVA provides a fit equal to that of an ordinary regression with a single constant
(a grand mean). Given the test statistic, we reject this hypothesis and conclude that there are significant
differences across countries. Second, by calculating an intra-class correlation, using the values of τ00 and σ2
(the formula for ICC is ρˆ = τ00τ00+σ2 ) we can say that ρˆ = 0.101, indicating that approximately 10% of the
variation in attitudes toward tax evasion is explained by variation across countries, whereas the remaining
90% is explained by individual level variation.
9We also estimated a number of models allowing for a random slope parameter, i.e. estimating country-
level coefficients on our just deserts variable. These models explain less variation than otherwise identical
models containing only a random intercept parameter and so are not reported here.
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In this model, the country-level intercept is estimated by:
β0j = γ00 + γ01 ∗ ginij + γ02 ∗ cpij + γ03 ∗ gdpj + u0j (3)
Table 2: Justifying Dishonest/Corrupt Acts: Random Intercepts Model
Variable Coefficient S.E. P-value
Hardwork 0.069 0.002 0.000
Equality 0.002 0.002 0.465
Trust 0.004 0.014 0.786
Income 0.034 0.003 0.000
Gini 0.008 0.002 0.000
Corruption -0.006 0.013 0.639
GDP -0.001 0.0003 0.000
γ00 1.884 0.137 0.00
τ00 0.716 0.061
σ2 2.193 0.004
N (# obs) 131,691
M (# groups) 70
Log-Likelihood -290433.8
LR test (χ22,1) 10560.1 0.000
Importantly for our principal hypothesis, those who score higher on hardwork (indicating
that they think luck and connections are more important in determining success) are signif-
icantly more likely to justify cheating on ones income taxes. This effect is not substantively
trivial, as it indicates that for every point increase in hardwork, there is a 0.07 point increase
(on a 10-point scale) in justification of tax evasion. Given that income is also measured on
a 10-point scale, we can compare the magnitude of its coefficient with that of hardwork and
see that the effect of hardwork is twice the size of the effect of income. Nor is the statistical
significance purely the result of such a large dataset (and the small standard errors that
accompany it), as it is the case that two other level-1 variables (trust and equality) fail
to achieve statistical significance. Finally, we do see that there are small, but highly signif-
icant, effects for the level-2 variables Gini and GDP, with their coefficients indicating that
respondents in poorer and more unequal countries are more likely to justify tax evasion.
Because we calculate a random intercepts model, we can extract the country-specific
intercepts from our models estimations, which can give us an idea of the extent to which
income tax evasion is believed to be justifiable in the U.S. and Italy, our two countries of
interest. The estimated intercept, β0j, for Italy is 1.96 (s.e. = 0.09) and for the U.S. is 1.66
(s.e. = 0.05), indicating that Italian respondents are more likely to find tax evasion more
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justifiable. On the other hand, if we look at the average levels of the hardwork variable, we
find that Americans are more likely to perceive their country as exhibiting a meritocratic
income distribution as the average response is 3.68 (s.e. = 2.34) in the U.S. sample compared
to 5.31 (s.e. = 2.58) in the Italian sample.
At the level of the model we find a significant reduction in deviance10 of model 2 compared
to model 1. Based on the values of τ00 and σ2 in model 2, the ICC = 0.246, indicating that
nearly 25% of the variance in the outcome is now explained by cross-country differences.
Our multilevel analysis provides us with some robust results which can serve as a roadmap
for our analysis of the experimental results in the next section. We can conclude that there
is a strong, positive relationship between the perceived inequity of the income distribution
and the willingness to tolerate tax evasion (and a number of other dishonest or corrupt
acts). Though these results have a strong degree of external validity, they likely suffer from
significant endogeneity problems that the methods we employ here are not equipped to
address. For this reason, we conduct a controlled incentivized laboratory experiment in the
United States and Italy. In the experiment, we manipulate the meritocratic equity and the
equality of the income generating process to study its effects on subjects’ dishonesty. With
an incentivized experiment designed to investigate the relationship between just deserts and
dishonesty, we can test whether the general predisposition we uncover in the MLM data
can also manifest itself as a behavioral tendency. Moreover, because we conduct identical
experimental treatments in Italy and the U.S. we can investigate whether there are differences
in behavior between the Italian and American subject pools, as might be expected given that
in the MLM we estimate that 25% of the variation in the willingness to justify tax evasion
is due to cross-country variation.
5 The Experiment
5.1 Overview
The experimental sessions were conducted at the LES (Laboratorio di Economia Sociale)
Laboratory of the University of Bologna (Forlì Campus) in June 2011 and February 2013,
and at the Center for Behavioral Political Economy at Stony Brook University (SBU) in
April and November 2012 and February 2013. All subjects were students recruited using
the on-line recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). 144 subjects participated in the
sessions conducted in Forlì and 164 subjects participated in the sessions run in Stony Brook.
In the experiment, earnings were calculated in wolfies. At the end of each session subjects
10Deviance is equal to −2 × log-likelihood.
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were paid in cash and in private at the subjects’ stations. Average payments were €11.34
(about $15) at Forlì and $16.82 at SBU. Each session lasted around 40-60 minutes, including
instructions and final payments. The experiment was computerized and programmed using
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Computer desks were divided by partitions in order
to avoid eye contact between subjects. Subjects received instructions both on their computer
screen and on paper. In the instructions, we avoided any suggestive terminology. A copy of
the instructions can be found in an appendix. The experiment was divided into two main
stages: a first stage with a real-effort task to measure performance/effort and assign initial
endowments and the groups between which the random pairings are made for the second
stage; and a custodial stage where we measured the level of dishonesty of one subject who
was asked to record the transfers of money from a second subject’s “escrow” account to her
own account.11
5.2 The Real-Effort Task
The real effort task consisted in counting the occurrences of the letters “e” and “c” for
each line of a 15-line text in German.12 Before starting the task, subjects were informed
that, after its completion, they will be divided into two equally sized groups based on their
relative performance.13 In particular, subjects whose performance was above the median
were going to be designated “high performers,” whereas subjects whose performance was
below the median were going to be designated “low performers.” Subjects were also told
that they will be assigned to one of four possible scenarios which were defined by how the
high and low performers were going to be remunerated for the task.14 More specifically, the
instructions informed the subjects that “in three of the four scenarios the payment to the
high performers will be greater than or equal to the payment to the low performers. In one
out of the four scenarios the payment to the high performers will be less than the payment
11After the two main stages, we conducted another real-effort task, analogous to the one in the first stage,
in order to gauge individual motivation and learning during the experiment. Before paying the subjects,
we also asked them to fill in a demographic and psychological questionnaire. This questionnaire was not
administered in the first sessions run in Italy for which, therefore, we do not have the information about the
demographics of the participants. The details of these demographics are in the supplementary appendix.
12The text was taken from the Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant. In particular, we extracted
two parts from Kant’s book. In each session, the computer randomly assigned one part to the first real-effort
task, and the second part to the second real-effort task. Hence, the order of the two parts was randomized
across sessions. The reason of this randomization is that we wanted to control for the possibility that one
part was easier to solve than the other when we compared the performance between the first and second
real-effort task.
13The performance of each subject was measured by taking the deviation in absolute value between the
true number of c’s and e’s in each line of the text and the number recorded by the subject. The lower the
score the higher the performance.
14Each scenario corresponds to a different treatment of the experiment.
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to the low performers.”15 The amount of money earned in the first stage was communicated
to each subject immediately before starting the second stage, and it constituted the initial
endowment with which each subject entered the second stage.
5.3 The Custodial Stage
In the second stage, each subject was matched with another participant. One subject was
assigned the role of participant A, while the other the role of participant B. Participant A
was the Owner of an “escrow” account which was credited with $15 (€10). Participant B did
not receive any additional endowment and played the role of the Custodian of the partner’s
account. After the assignment of the custodial relationships, the decision-making element
of stage 2 began. Each subject designated as Custodian received a series of 25 consecutive
binary signals generated at random from a symmetric binomial distribution.16 Each signal
was either red or green and known only privately by each Custodian.17 The color of each
signal was meant to instruct the Custodian whether to transfer an amount of $0.60 (0.40€)
to herself (in case of a green signal) or leave it in the Owner’s account (in case of a red
signal). Each Custodian was asked to record the color of each signal received. Subjects were
instructed that it was only the recording of the signal that affected payoffs, not the signal
itself. Since each signal was private information of the Custodian, the design allowed the
Custodians to misrepresent the signal (if they wished) enabling them to increase or decrease
their own payoff at the expense or benefit of their partner.18 To make sure that subjects
15This information has potential implications for the incentive compatibility of the task, but nonetheless,
this is preferable to deception. Since better performance on the task could potentially result in a lower payoff,
the effort decision is taken under uncertainty and, ex ante the task may not be fully incentive compatible.
To measure the actual distance from full motivation, we had the subjects complete a similar, but fully
incentivized effort task at the end of the second stage, and we solicited self-reported assessments of effort
on a 0-4 scale for each of the two tasks. Subjects performed significantly better (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p = 0.000) and reported a significantly higher effort (p = 0.000) in the second (fully incentivized) task.
However, the difference between the two self-reported efforts was tiny (the mean self-reported effort in the
first real-effort task was 3.31, in the second 3.50). In addition, in both tasks, the majority of people (86% in
the first real-effort task, 92% in the second) reported an effort of 3 or 4. We can thus attribute most of the
better performance in the second real-effort task to learning rather than lack of incentives in the first task.
Note also that if subjects did not take seriously the first real-effort task, our manipulation would have been
less effective. This however is not the case as we observe strong behavioral differences across treatments
in line with the prediction of equity theory. Hence, if anything, this potential confound works against our
hypothesis, and thus the true effects may be even stronger.
16The signal generating process was carefully explained to the subjects. In particular, it was described as
being equivalent to a coin flip.
17It was common knowledge that the revelation of the signal itself was private; that is, only the Custodian,
but not the Owner of the escrow account knew the actual realization of the signal. The experimenters
also knew with certainty the realization of each draw, but, of course, the subjects were anonymous to the
experimenters, and thus the decisions of each subject could not be attributed to them personally.
18The amount of each possible single transfer was equal to 1/25 of the total value of the escrow account
($15/€10) contained in the Owner’s account. Hence, given the symmetry of the binomial distribution, the
ex ante expected value of the final amount of money, which remained in the account after the task, was one
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understood the procedures, we asked them to complete some practice rounds with forced
input before starting the task. In these rounds, subjects were encouraged to experiment
with the recording of the signals and to observe the effect it had on payoffs—both theirs and
their partner’s. Thus, they were able to observe that a signal misrepresented as green rather
than red would in fact result in an increase in their own payoffs. This measure was meant to
ensure that the subjects realized they could misrepresent a red signal with impunity.19 Figure
1 shows the computer screen faced by a Custodian. During the task, while the Custodians
reported the color of the signals, the Owners of the account were asked to predict the number
of red signals that the Custodian would report.20
To characterize the qualitative nature of the Custodians’ dishonesty, we borrow the ty-
pology developed in Erat and Gneezy (2012). Their typology of lying is based on its effects
on the payoffs of the liar and another party. They differentiate between “altruistic” and
“Pareto” white lies, in which the liar benefits another party, either at his own expense (al-
truistic) or in such a way as to be beneficial to both (Pareto). They define a black lie as
one which is detrimental to the other party. There are “spiteful”—hurting both parties—and
“selfish”—hurting only the other party—black lies. In our experiment, because the reporting
of the signal has a zero-sum effect on payoffs, if the Custodian is dishonest, it is either a
“selfish black lie” (selfish dishonesty)—when the Custodian reports a red signal as green—or
an “altruistic white lie” (altruistic dishonesty)—when he reports a green signal as red. We
are primarily interested in the selfish black lies, because it is this type of lie that we hypoth-
esize should result from perceptions of negative inequity. However, we also investigate the
role played by altruistic white lies, though we expect that those will be much less common
than the selfish sort.
5.4 Treatments
In the experiment, we manipulate, along both the equity and equality dimensions, the remu-
neration of the first stage as a function of the relative performance of the participants in the
real-effort task. In particular, we crossed, in a between-subject fashion, two dimensions of
the income distribution: (meritocratic) equity and equality. This resulted in 4 treatments,
as summarized in Table 3.
half of the initial endowment, allowing for an equal split of the endowment between the two partners. Note
that this is the case if and only if the signals are reported honestly by the Custodian.
19It was crucial that the subjects realize that they could misrepresent the signal they receive. In this
manner they are constrained only by their ethical scruples and not by a fear of shame or retribution for their
actions.
20The prediction was not incentivized.
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Figure 1: Screenshot of Signal Reporting Stage
Table 3: Two-factor design: Equality and Equity
Equity
Equality Equal/Equitable Equal/InequitableUnequal/Equitable Unequal/Inequitable
5.4.1 Treatment EE: Equal and Equitable
In this treatment, the distribution of the income is equal: both high and low performers
receive the same remuneration after the first stage. Moreover, it is also equitable: subjects
are (randomly) paired high with high performers and low with low performers in the second
stage of the experiment. This means that in some cases (and unique to this treatment) the
low-performers are in the decision making role (what we denoted as B above), whereas in the
others, the high performers are so positioned. Thus, the income distribution among partners
is both equal and equitable because both subjects within each pair are compensated with
the same amount for an identical category of performance. To control for income effects we
conduct two sub-treatments, in which both high and low performers receive a remuneration
of $10 (€7) in the high income sub-treatment and $3 (€2) in the low income sub-treatment.
In both of the income sub-treatments the payments are equal—so OA = OB, and because the
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pairings are homogenous with respect to performance, then the inputs must be equal, and
so IA = IB. Therefore, OA/IA = OB/IB. This situation is equivalent to Scenario 4 in Section
3. Because in the EE treatment (and only in the EE) the pairings are homogeneous with
respect to performance, the relative valuation attached to each type of performance is of no
relevance for ones decision (assuming that the Custodian’s psychological referent is indeed
the subject with whom he was paired). Moreover, there is no information provided within
the context of the experiment that would allow the subjects to differentially assign just
deserts, as the members of each pair are objectively indistinguishable. Thus, this treatment
allows us to determine a baseline level of (selfish and altruistic) dishonesty that should—by
the design of the experiment—be divorced from concerns of equity.
5.4.2 Treatment EI: Equal and Inequitable
In this treatment, the distribution of the income is equal: both high and low performers re-
ceive the same remuneration after the first stage. However, it is inequitable: high performing
subjects are (randomly) paired with low performers in the second stage of the experiment.
This situation is equivalent to Scenario 2 in Section 3, where OA = OB but IB > IA. Because
the outcome (initial endowment) for each of the pair was equal (OA = OB), the scenario
would only be equitable if IA = IB. That would imply an identical valuation of both low and
high performance, meaning that I∗A,EI = 1. This implies that if one has even the slimmest
belief in just deserts (i.e., that higher performance deserves a higher reward) then this is
an inequitable scenario for B (the high performer). High performers receive compensation
equivalent to their low-performing partners, despite the common knowledge of their superior
performance. Just as in the EE treatment, to control for income effects, we conduct two
sub-treatments, where both high and low performers receive a remuneration of $10 (€7) (the
high income sub-treatment) and $3 (€2) (the low income sub-treatment).
5.4.3 Treatment UE: Unequal and Equitable
In this treatment, the distribution of the income is unequal: the high performers receive
a remuneration of $10 (€7) after the first stage of the experiment, while low performers
receive a remuneration of $3 (€2). Subjects were (randomly) paired high-low performers.
Hence, the income distribution between partners could be viewed as equitable, depending
on the relative valuations placed on high and low performance. More precisely, I∗A,UE = 3/10
(or 2/7 in the Italian sessions), or, in other words low performance—IA—must be discounted
by a factor of 0.3 (0.29) relative to high performance—IB—in order for the scenario to be
equitable.21 This treatment can be described by Scenario 3 in Section 3.
21Thus, there is a sensible value of I∗A which would render the scenario equitable. For this reason, we
categorize this treatment as “equitable.” Moreover, from the standpoint of the high-performer, the scenario,
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5.4.4 Treatment UI: Unequal and Inequitable
Here, the high performers receive a compensation of $3 (€2) after the first stage, while the
low performers received a remuneration of $10 (€7). Hence, the income distribution between
partners was both unequal and inequitable, since those who performed better in the real effort
task were paid less than their partners who performed worse. In this treatment, I∗A,UI =
10/3 (7/2), meaning that one could hold anti-meritocratic views (indicating a preference for
rewarding poor performance) and still feel that the scenario is inequitable toward the high-
performer, because in order for the scenario to be equitable, one must value low performance
by a ratio of 10 to 3 (7 to 2) compared to high performance. Thus, even if one valued low
performance over high performance at a ratio of 2 to 1, the scenario would still be inequitable
toward the high performer, thus giving a greater justification for (selfish) dishonesty to reduce
the inequity. This treatment corresponds to what we refer as Scenario 1 in Section 3.
From the values of I∗A,k we can predict the relative levels of selfish dishonesty D(k) in
treatment k, thus D(UI) > D(EI) > D(UE) ≥ D(EE).22
We can contrast this to the prediction of a theory of purely self-interested dishonesty
motives. Such a theory would predict that dishonesty across the treatments should be equal
across treatments, especially because the signals can be misrepresenting with impunity—the
only thing that would perhaps constrain dishonest behavior is a norm against dishonesty.
Thus, if we find no differences across the treatments, then a theory of self interested dis-
honesty would better explain the results.23 On the other hand, differences consistent with
the predictions of equity theory laid out above would be strong evidence in favor of our
hypothesis that dishonesty increases as a result of violations of the just deserts principle,
and does so as a way of modifying ones outcomes such that the resulting distribution is more
equitable.
As it is clear from the description of the different treatments, the between-subjects manip-
ulation also determines the way subjects were paired in the Custodial Stage, and this pairing
was based on the subjects’ performance in the real-effort task of the first stage. In the EE
treatment, low performers were randomly paired with low performers and high performers
if inequitable, is advantageously so. So, we also use such a designation for the sake of convenience, so as to
avoid a need to differentiate between positive and negative inequity.
22The valuation of performance is not relevant for the decision in Treatment EE, because from the stand-
point of the rules and information available B—a high (low) performer—cannot differentiate himself from
A—another high (low) performer. Therefore, so long as B uses A as a referent, OA/IA = OB/IB and any selfish
dishonesty in EE should not be a result of feelings of inequity. On the other hand, even if high performers
were compensated for their performance in UE, the difference may be small enough that they believe the
scenario still to be inequitable, and therefore equity theory does allow for some degree of selfish inequality in
this case, depending on the beliefs of the Custodian as to how much high performance should be differentially
rewarded. Thus we expect the same or a greater degree of selfish dishonesty in UE compared to EE.
23It would still, however, not explain why dishonesty wasn’t maximal.
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with high performers. In the other three treatments, low performers played the role of Own-
ers and were randomly paired with high performers, who played the role of Custodians. The
role assignment is summarized in Table 4.
Table 4: Role-assignment in the four treatments
Treatment Owner Custodian
EE High (Low) performer High (Low) performer
EI Low Performer High Performer
UE Low Performer High Performer
UI Low Performer High Performer
5.5 Behavioral Hypotheses and Conjectures
Our experimental design enables us to test two main behavioral conjectures. First, as in
section 2 we uncovered a significant association between perceptions of unjust deserts and
dishonesty, we seek some corroborating experimental evidence on that relationship. Our
design allows us to measure the extent to which procedural unfairness induces dishonesty on
the part of the Custodians. In particular, the following conjecture can be verified:
Hypothesis 1. Meritocratic inequity will induce greater selfish dishonesty on the part of
those disadvantaged by the performance-payoff mapping, and to the extent that they are
disadvantaged. More formally from the values of I∗A,k we can predict the relative levels of
selfish dishonesty Ds(k) in treatment k, thus Ds(UI) > Ds(EI) > Ds(UE) ≥ Ds(EE).
This hypothesis can be tested by measuring the extent to which the Custodians selfishly
misrepresent the signal they receive. Across all four of our treatments, the Custodians
are afforded the discretion of misrepresenting their private signals with impunity. Thus,
the extent to which Custodians differ in their rates of selfish dishonesty across treatments
represents an effect of manipulations.24
Hypothesis 2. Because the high-performer receives a higher initial payment in treatment
UE, it is the only scenario in which positive inequity—inequity that benefits the Custodian—
may arise. Therefore, we expect this treatment to have the highest amount of altruistic
dishonesty. Any altruistic dishonesty in the other treatments must be motivated by something
other than meritocratic equity concerns.
24Since there is no sanction for dishonest behavior, the theoretical prediction about the behavior of a
purely self-interested Custodian is that he will report only green signals, irrespective of the actual signal
received, which means a rate of selfish dishonesty of 100%. The more a subject deviates from this prediction,
the more he would appear to comply with the rules even though they are not enforceable. There were a
handful of subjects, some in each of the treatments, who did, in fact, report 25 green signals, and thus would
appear to be unaffected by the treatment. Removing these subjects from the analysis strengthens many of
the results we discuss below.
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The next claim—in this case a conjecture rather than a hypothesis because it does not
follow directly from our theory—that we consider concerns the differential reaction to unjust
deserts in the U.S. and in Italy, and the overall attitude towards dishonesty of the two
countries. In particular, Americans believe more strongly in the principle of just deserts
than do Italians (or any other nation for that matter) (Kunovich and Slomczynski, 2007).
Moreover, the American income distribution is in actuality more reflective of the the just
deserts principle (Kunovich and Slomczynski, 2007), and therefore Americans should be
affected more by violations of the just deserts principle. Based on this evidence, we make
the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1. American subjects will be more sensitive to violations of the just deserts
principle as well as generally less dishonest than Italian subjects.25
5.6 Experimental Results
We now turn to the analysis of the data. We first conduct the analysis for the (selfish)
black lies (selfish dishonesty). We then conduct the same analysis for the (altruistic) white
lies (altruistic dishonesty). We define the rate of selfish dishonesty as the number of red
signals reported as green divided by the total number of red signals received. This variable
provides a normalized measure of the rate of (selfish) black lies. Figure 2 displays the rates
of selfish dishonesty for each experimental treatment, distinguishing between sessions run
in Italy and US.26 At first glance, it seems that the inequitable treatments (EI and UI)
were characterized by a much greater degree of black lies, especially in the sessions run
in US. Indeed if we look at the mean rate of selfish dishonesty across treatments, these
relative magnitude of these rates is exactly as predicted by equity theory: Ds(UI) = 0.36 >
Ds(EI) = 0.31 > Ds(UE) = 0.25 > Ds(EE) = 0.19 In addition, Italian subjects seemed to
be generally more dishonest than American subjects. We can investigate more formally with
non-parametric tests whether there is any difference in the rates of selfish dishonesty across
treatments (to test hypothesis 1) and subject pools (to test conjecture 1). If we compare the
rate of selfish dishonesty across treatments, in the aggregate, subjects displayed statistically
significant higher rates of selfish dishonesty in the UI treatment compared to the UE and
EE treatment respectively (p = 0.076 and 0.004), and in the EI treatment compared to EE
treatment (p = 0.035). Though not all of the hypothesized treatment effects are as predicted
25Our conjecture is based in part on the finding that Americans perceive their economic system to be
characterized to a greater degree by just deserts than do Italians (Kunovich and Slomczynski, 2007).
26Since we did not detect any statistically significant difference, both in aggregate and within each sample
pool, between the high and low income sub-treatments of the EE and EI treatment respectively (p > 0.1),
we pooled the data of the sub-treatments together. Similarly, we did not find any statistically significant
difference, both in aggregate and within each sample pool, between the rates of selfish dishonesty of high
and low performers in the EE treatment (p > 0.1), and, therefore, we pooled the data together.
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by equity theory, many are and the absolute magnitude of the degree of selfish dishonesty
across treatments, is exactly as predicted by equity theory. To evaluate conjecture 1, we pool
the data of the treatments together and compare the rate of selfish dishonesty of Italian and
American subjects. We do not detect any statistically significant difference (Mann-Whitney
test, p > 0.1). Similarly, we do not detect any statistically significant difference between
Italian and American subjects in we consider each treatment separately (p > 0.1). Based on
these findings, we present our first result27:
Result 1. In the aggregate, there is more selfish dishonesty in the inequitable treatments than
in their corresponding equitable treatments. This is strong evidence of our hypothesis that
the lack of just deserts causes an increase in selfish dishonesty. This finding, which is con-
sistent with Hypothesis 1 represents a behavioral corroboration of the dispositional tendency
we uncover in the MLM results reported in the previous section, thus providing convergent
evidence of our principal empirical hypothesis. The predictions of equity theory were largely
borne out, especially as regards the ordering of the treatments with respect to their levels of
selfish dishonesty.
This result, however, appears to be mostly driven by the American subjects who display
statistically significant higher rates of selfish dishonesty in the UI treatment compared to
the UE and EE treatment respectively (p = 0.061 and 0.019), and in the EI treatment
compared to EE treatment (p = 0.011). American subjects also exhibited a much greater
degree of black lies in the EI treatment compared to the UE treatment (p = 0.067). Italian
subjects displayed significantly higher rates of selfish dishonesty in the UI treatment only in
comparison to the EE treatment (p = 0.062). We can thus present our second result:
Result 2. American subjects are more sensitive to unjust deserts than Italian subjects as
they tend to display lower rates of selfish dishonesty when the income distribution is equitable
and higher rates when the income distribution is inequitable.
We now turn to the analysis of the (altruistic) white lies. We define the rate of altruistic
dishonesty as the number of green signals reported as red divided by the total number of
green signals received. This variable provides a normalized measure of the rate of white lies.
Figure 3 displays the average rates of altruistic dishonesty for each experimental treatment,
27This result, as well as the following findings, cannot be explained by differences in the number of red
signals—randomly generated by the computer for each Custodian—received by different Custodians across
treatments, countries and subject types (high and low performers). We did not in fact detect any statistically
significant difference across treatments, countries and subject types on the number of red signals received by
the Custodians (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0.1).
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Figure 2: Selfish Dishonesty by Treatment
distinguishing between sessions run in Italy and the U.S.28 Overall, altruistic dishonesty was
significantly higher in US compared to Italy (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.027), especially in
the EE treatment (p = 0.088) and in the high income EI sub-treatment (p = 0.012). If we
pool together American and Italian subjects we find no differences in the rates of altruistic
dishonesty across treatments (p > 0.1). If we consider only the Italian sample, altruistic
dishonesty was lower in the high-income EI treatment compared to the low-income EI, UI
and UE treatment respectively (p = 0.033, 0.071 and 0.033), suggesting that Italian subjects
were sensitive to income effects when the income distribution was negatively inequitable
toward the high performer. If we consider only the US sample, there was no difference in the
rate of altruistic dishonesty across treatments (p > 0.1). The rates of altruistic dishonesty
are much lower and much more noisy than the rates of selfish dishonesty, and they do not
fit the predictions of equity theory particularly well. We suspect that this is because being
disadvantaged by inequitable rules provides a greater justification for dishonesty than being
advantaged by inequitable rules. Nonetheless, we can derive the following results:
Result 3. Treatment UE is not characterized by a greater rate of altruistic dishonesty than
any of the other treatments. Thus, there is no systematic relationship between equity theory
28As for the analysis of the black lies, we checked whether there was any statistically significant difference,
both in aggregate and within each sample pool, between the high and low income sub-treatments of the
EE and EI treatment respectively. We detected a statistically significant difference in altruistic dishonesty
between the high and low income EI sub-treatments only in the Italian sample (p = 0.033). Hence, in the
analysis of the data, we will analyze each sub-treatment of the EI treatment separately. We also checked
whether there was any statistically significant difference, both in aggregate and within each sample pool,
between the rates of altruistic dishonesty of high and low performers in the EE treatment. We did not find
any difference (p > 0.1), and, therefore, we pooled the data together.
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and the the rates of altruistic dishonesty across treatments and therefore Hypothesis 2 is not
supported by the evidence.
Result 4. Italian subjects displayed lower rates of altruistic dishonesty than American sub-
jects, especially in the Equal treatments.
Figure 3: Altruistic Dishonesty by Treatment
Our measure of dishonesty (both selfish and altruistic), analyzed so far, is appropriate if
we think of the decision to be dishonest as playing out independently for each signal received
by the Custodian. It is likely, however, that subjects had a supergame strategy designed to
realize a final distribution acceptable to the subject. To analyze such a strategy, we instead
measure dishonesty as a ratio of the total number of red signals reported to the total number
of red signals received (rate of overall honesty). This measure actually takes into account
both types of dishonesty, selfish and altruistic, and thus could be greater than one if a subject
engaged in altruistic white lies (i.e. reported the signal as red when it was in fact green).
Figure 4 displays the average rate of overall honesty for each experimental treatment.29
Overall, subjects in the U.S. were statistically significantly more honest than subjects in
Italy (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.026), especially in the UE treatment (p = 0.076) and EE
treatment (p = 0.056). If we conduct pairwise comparisons of the treatments, pooling the
data of the Italian and American sessions together, honesty was statistically significantly
29No statistically significant difference was found within the EE and EI treatments respectively between
the low and high income subtreatments, both in aggregate and for each subject pool (Mann-Whitney test,
p > 0.1). Hence, we pooled the data of the subtreatments together. Similarly, we detected no difference,
neither in aggregate nor within each sample pool, between the rates of overall dishonesty of high and low
performers in the EE treatment (p > 0.1). Hence, we pooled the data together.
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lower in the UI treatment compared to the UE and EE treatment respectively (p = 0.075
and 0.002), and in the EI treatment compared to the EE treatment (p = 0.064). If we
consider only the Italian subject pool, honesty was statistically significantly lower in the UI
treatment compared to the EI and EE treatment respectively (p = 0.068 and 0.031). If we
consider only the American subject pool, dishonesty was statistically significantly lower in
the UI treatment compared to the UE and EE treatment respectively (p = 0.072 and 0.011),
and in the EI treatment compared to the EE treatment (p = 0.023). Altogether these tests
bring us to the following two results.
Result 5. American subjects reacted more to just deserts than Italian subjects by reporting
a larger proportion of red signals when the income distribution was equitable and a smaller
proportion when the income distribution was inequitable.
Result 6. Italian subjects reported a smaller proportion of red signals than American sub-
jects.
Figure 4: Rate of Honesty by Treatment
To test the robustness of the aforementioned results we conduct a regression analysis in
which we are also able to investigate and control for the dynamics of dishonesty over the 25
signal periods. In particular, we run two separate regressions, one for the Italian sample and
one for the American sample. We employ logit regressions with random effects to control
for the non-independence of the observations at the subject level. The dependent variable
is a dichotomous variable which takes value 1 if a signal is recorded as red and 0 if it is
recorded as green. The independent variables are the actual signal (1 if red, 0 if green), the
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Table 5: Random Effects Logit regressions
US Italy
b se p b se p
Red signal(t) 4.321*** 0.325 0.000 5.112*** 0.406 0.000
Red Signal (t-1) -0.416** 0.173 0.016 -0.271 0.196 0.167
Red Signal (t-1)+(t-2) 0.142 0.201 0.481 -0.009 0.235 0.971
Red Signal×UI -1.082** 0.449 0.016 -1.575*** 0.606 0.009
Red Signal×UE 1.417** 0.641 0.027 -0.415 0.689 0.547
Red Signal×EI -1.188*** 0.417 0.004 -0.615 0.523 0.239
UI -0.846 0.682 0.215 0.291 0.797 0.715
UE -1.287* 0.687 0.061 -0.398 0.838 0.635
EI -0.741 0.594 0.213 0.164 0.645 0.800
Effort -0.207 0.261 0.428 -0.106 0.325 0.743
Period -0.009 0.01 0.396 -0.006 0.012 0.635
Constant -0.753 1.044 0.471 -3.059** 1.204 0.011
Obs 1886 1656
Pseudo χ2 0.476 0.425
Df 11 11
Prob > F 0 0
previous actual signal (1 if red, 0 if green), a dummy which takes value equal to 1 if the two
previous consecutive signals were red, the treatment dummies (the baseline category is the
EE treatment), interaction terms between the treatment dummies and the actual signal, the
signal period (1 to 25), and the effort reported by the subject in the first real-effort task.30
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 5.
Both American and Italian subjects were more likely to record a red signal when they
received a private red signal. In addition, there is evidence that American subjects were less
likely to report a red signal if the color of the previous signal was red. Once we controlled
for these dynamics, we observe that American subjects in the UI treatment were less likely
to send a red signal when they received a private red signal compared to all the other
treatments (-1.575***). American subjects were also less likely to send a red signal when
they received a private red signal in the UI and EI treatment compared to EE (-1.082**
30We also ran these same models, but with the addition of the demographic characteristics of the subjects
as covariates (in particular, age, gender and whether they study economics or business). These regressions
are in the appendix and present results quite similar to those reported here. In the regression which uses
the Italian data, we however lose 1200 observations (25 signals for 48 subjects) since we did not collect the
demographic characteristics in the first sessions run in Italy. We also compare the proportion of Custodians
with a background in economics and business between US and Italy (see appendix). Previous studies have
in fact observed that students in economics are significantly more corrupted (Frank and Schulze, 2000) and
tend to steal more money (Zizzo, 2004) than others. The proportion of Custodians with a background in
economics or business is very small in both locations and the difference is not statically significant. Hence,
it cannot explain the higher level of dishonesty of the Italian Custodians.
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and -1.188***). Compared to American subjects in the EE treatment, there is also strong
evidence that Americans in the UE treatment were overall more likely to send a red signal
when the private signal was red (1.417**), and less likely to send a red signal when the signal
was green (-1.287*). Italian subjects in the UI treatment were less likely to send a red signal
when they received a private red signal compared to all the other treatments (-1.575***).
These results confirm the fact that, while for American subjects increased dishonesty was
associated with a decrease in perceived just deserts quite independently of the equality
of the incomes, Italian subjects tended to behave more dishonestly only when the income
distribution was both inequitable and unequal.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study we have focused attention on the role that just deserts—or its absence—
plays in the maintenance of the basic societal norm of honesty. The motivation for this study
is captured in the first epigraphic quote “If people feel that they are taken advantage of, why
should they not rip off the system in return?” (Elster, 1989, p. 180). Specifically, we rely
on equity theory (Adams, 1965) to construct and test the hypothesis that the violation of
the just deserts principle induces greater dishonest on the part of those disadvantaged by
the violation. Despite (or perhaps because of) its simplicity, equity theory offers a general
framework for investigations of the violations of just deserts and their subsequent effect on
dishonesty.
While the proposition that those who feel as they have been treated unfairly are more
likely to behave dishonestly may be intuitively appealing, aside from Houser et al. (2012),
this proposition has received scant attention. We use an empirical strategy which draws both
on a novel experimental design—in which we manipulate both the equality and the equity of
the income allocation procedure—and multilevel regression analysis of cross-national World
Values Survey data, to uncover convergent evidence that supports this claim. Moreover, we
uncover differences between the behavior between the Italian and American experimental
subject pools, suggesting—in line with previous research—that Americans are more sensi-
tive to meritocratic concerns than are Italians. Kunovich and Slomczynski (2007) provides
evidence that the levels of both actual and perceived meritocracy are lower in Italy than
the United States. Therefore, we can conjecture that because Italians are “pre-treated” with
lower expectations of just deserts, they can more easily justify selfish dishonesty than Amer-
icans. On the other hand, precisely because Americans tend to have higher expectations for
meritocracy, they may be more sensitive to its absence. Another potential explanation could
be that Italians have a shared understanding of low expectations in terms of effort put into
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work (Gambetta et al., 2009). As a result, they may feel that meritocracy is not particularly
relevant if the expectation is that compatriots will most likely shirk (though the causality
most likely runs in both directions).
As discussed above, situations in which self-fulfilling beliefs sustain multiple equilibria
occur in the relationship between just deserts and attitudes toward redistribution (Bénabou
and Tirole, 2006; Alesina et al., 2001; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009).
We speculate that violations of the principle of just deserts can similarly generate multiple
equilibria with respect to dishonesty. If individuals respond to an absence of just deserts
with dishonesty and corruption, then this might result in a societal distribution of resources
which is lacking to an even greater degree in just deserts, thus creating a self-reinforcing
spiral into an ever-more dishonest and less virtuous society.
From a methodological point of view, in our empirical approach we exploit two sources
of evidence, combining a Multi-Level Model based on WVS and a cross-country laboratory
experiment. The multilevel modeling allows us to control for and isolate the country level
effects and therefore get a cleaner measure of our theoretical relationship of interest, which
is then tested in the experimental analysis. The results provide convergent evidence of this
relationship, making a more convincing case than either evidence on its own.
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A Appendix: Additional Demographic Information and Analysis
A.1 Demographic Variables
Table A.1 reports the demographic variables collected at the end of the experiment. We
did not collect the demographic information in the first sessions run in Italy (56 out of 144
subjects).
Table A.1: Demographic Variables
Characteristics US Italy
Gender (n=161)a (n=96)
Female 52.17% (84) 58.33% (56)
Male 47.83% (77) 41.67% (40)
Age (n=162)b (n=96)
Mean 20.15 22.82
St. dev. 2.70 3.23
Econ./Bus. (n=162)b (n=88)c
No 91.98% (149) 85.23% (75)
Yes 8.02% (13) 14.77% (13)
Citizenship (n=129)d (n=144)
non-American/non-Italian 13.95% (18) 0% (0)
non-American/Italian 86.05% (111) 100% (144)
Years in US (n = 18)
Mean 4.32
St. Dev. 5.06
Notes: a Three subjects did not report their gender. b Two subjects did not report the age and
their field of studies. c Eight subjects did not report their field of studies.d We did not include this
question in the first sessions run in US, and, therefore we do not have the information for 32
subjects. In addition, three subjects failed to report this information, resulting in a total of 35
missing observations.
A.2 Comparison of Custodians with a Background in Economics or Business
There have been a number of studies (e.g. Zizzo, 2004; Frank and Schulze, 2000) which
have found that students studying economics behave in a more self interested fashion in
experiments. It is possible, then, that Italian subjects behaved more dishonestly simply
because there were a higher proportion of participants who studied economics. To test this
possibility we can compare the proportion of Custodians with a major in economics in Italy
and US (see Table A.2).31 The proportion of Custodians with a major in economics is not
31We do not have the information about the field of studies for all the participants. In particular, 2 out
of 164 subjects in the US sessions did not report their field of studies. In addition, we did not collect the
demographic information in the first sessions run in Italy (56 out of 144 subjects). This does not pose any
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very large in either of the locations and the difference is not statistically significant (Chi-
squared test, p = 0.203). If we also include those Custodians with a major in business (see
Table A.3), the difference is still not statically significant (Chi-squared test, p = 0.664).
Table A.2: Field of Studies for Custodians: Economics vs. Others
Economics US Italy Tot
No 95.12% (78) 89.13% (41) 92.97% (119)
Yes 4.88% (4) 10.87% (5) 7.03% (9)
Tot. 100% (82) 100% (46) 100% (128)
Table A.3: Field of Studies for Custodians: Economics & Business vs. Others
Economics or Business US Italy Tot
No 91.46% (75) 89.13% (41) 90.63% (116)
Yes 8.54% (7) 10.87% (5) 9.38% (12)
Tot. 100% (82) 100% (46) 100% (128)
A.3 Regression analysis with Demographic Variables
Table A.4 displays the results from a specification similar to the regression analysis presented
in the Section 5 of the paper. For the Italian subjects, we do not have observations on the
demographics for the UI and UE treatments. So when we control for the demographics, those
data are dropped. The main results are unchanged. Consistently with previous studies who
show that students in economics display a more rational and profit-maximizing behavior
(e.g. Zizzo, 2004; Frank and Schulze, 2000), students with a background in economics are
more likely to report a green signal, both in Italy and US.
limitation to our analysis since the subjects were, in both locations, recruited randomly using the subject
pools maintained through ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Hence, the sub-sample of Italian subjects for which
we have the information about the field of study should be representative of all the Italian subjects that
participate in our experiment.
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Table A.4: Regression with Demographic Variables
US Italy
b se p b se p
Red signal(t) 4.305*** 0.324 0.000 5.177*** 0.42 0.000
Red Signal (t-1) -0.413** 0.173 0.017 -0.217 0.254 0.392
Red Signal (t-1)+(t-2) 0.139 0.201 0.489 -0.034 0.306 0.912
Red Signal×UI -1.067** 0.448 0.017
Red Signal×UE 1.431** 0.638 0.025
Red Signal×EI -1.168*** 0.416 0.005 -0.913* 0.534 0.087
UI -0.62 0.684 0.365
UE -1.17* 0.678 0.084
EI -0.489 0.603 0.418 0.282 0.657 0.668
Effort -0.115 0.259 0.656 -0.336 0.492 0.495
Age -0.039 0.124 0.75 0.092 0.07 0.189
Gender 0.028 0.434 0.949 -0.718 0.607 0.237
Economics -1.447* 0.801 0.071 -1.679* 0.92 0.068
Period -0.009 0.01 0.395 0 0.015 0.997
Constant -0.308 2.662 0.908 -4.077 2.43 0.093
Obs 1886 1058
Pseudo Chi2 0.677 0.427
Df 14 10
Prob > F 0 0
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B Appendix: Additional MLM Analysis
As discussed in Section 4 of the paper, the results regarding tolerance for dishonesty and
corruption as a function of belief in just deserts is robust to our choice of dependent variable.
In Section 4, we report the results from an MLM regression using the WVS item which asks
whether it is justifiable to “cheat on your taxes if you have a chance.” Here, instead, we
use an average of this item along with three other items: “accepting a bribe in the course
of ones duties”; “claiming undeserved government benefits” and “avoiding a fare on public
transport.”32 The estimating equations remain the same as those reported in Section 4 with
the only difference being the item(s) used for the dependent variable. Table B.1 reports the
results of this model. Though the coefficients for some of the control variables change sign,
the coefficient for the just deserts (“hardwork”) variable remains virtually unchanged. The
same pattern emerges if we take any of these items separately as the dependent variable.
Table B.1: Justifying Dishonest/Corrupt Acts: Random Intercepts Model
Variable Coefficient S.E. P-value
Hardwork 0.062 0.002 0.000
Equality -0.004 0.002 0.006
Trust 0.013 0.011 0.218
Income 0.019 0.002 0.000
Gini 0.009 0.002 0.000
Corruption -0.086 0.002 0.000
GDP 0.001 0.0002 0.000
γ00 1.945 0.114 0.00
τ00 0.583 0.051
σ2 1.594 0.003
N (# obs) 120,733
M (# groups) 68
Log-Likelihood -227753
LR test (χ22,1) 11746.6 0.000
32There are additional items which are conceptually related, including whether it is justifiable to engage
in the following activities: “joyriding”, “lying”, “paying cash to avoid taxes”, “buying stolen goods”, “keeping
money you have found” and “failing to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle.” How-
ever, because the there is much less coverage for these items, we do not report any results for them here.
Nonetheless, the relationship between a belief in just deserts and these items is the same as for the others
we report here.
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C Appendix: Instructions
The same instructions, translated in Italian, were used for the sessions conducted in Italy.
The Italian version of the instructions is available upon request.
Introduction
Welcome to the Decision Experiments Laboratory here at Stony Brook University. Today,
you will participate in a study of individual behavior lasting about an hour for which there
is a cash payment that depends on your choices and the choices of other participants.
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in wolfies. Each wolfie is worth
1 cent. Payment will be made in cash at the end of this session and the payments will be
carried out in such a way that no other participant will know how much you earned.
The experiment is divided into three phases. At each stage you will be asked to make
certain decisions or to answer some questions.
From this point on, all talking or other communication with other participants is pro-
hibited. If you want to ask a question, raise your hand. Please turn off you cell phones and
other devices and store them for the duration of the experiment.
Phase 1
In this stage you will be shown a text in a foreign language and you have to record on each
line the number of times the letters "c" and "e" appear. You have 5 minutes to complete
this exercise.
After all participants have completed the letter counting task, the computer will produce
a ranking of all participants based on their performance on the task. Your performance is
measured by taking the deviation, in absolute value, between the true number of c’s and e’s
in each line of the text and the number you recorded. This tally is recorded for each line
and then summed over all 15 lines of text. The participant with the lowest score is then
considered to have the best performance. The 12 participants with the lowest scores will
be classified as “high-performers” while the 12 participants with the highest scores will be
classified as “low-performers”.
For Treatments, UE, UI and EE
After your performance has been ranked, the computer will randomly select your partner for
Phase 2. If you are a “high-performer” you will be paired with a “low-performer” and if you
are a “low-performer” then you will be paired with a “high-performer”.
—OR—
For Treatment EE
After your performance has been ranked, the computer will randomly select your partner
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for Phase 2. If you are a “high-performer” you will be paired with another “high-performer”
and if you are a “low-performer” then you will be paired with another “low-performer”.
The assignment of your initial payment is based on whether you are classified as a high
performer or a low-performer. There are four possible cases for the payment:
In three of the four scenarios the payment to the high performers will be greater than or
equal to the payment to the low performers.
In one out of the four scenarios the payment to the high performers will be less than the
payment to the low performers.
You will be notified of which scenario you have been assigned to at the end of phase 1,
and just before the start of phase 2.
From here on out, please carefully follow the instructions on the screen. Remember to
click “continue” so the group can continue with the experiment.
Task
Here is a text in a foreign language. For each row, count how many times the letters “c” and
“e” appear. Then enter the number of times “c” appears in the first column, and enter the
number of times “e” appears in the second column.
Effort Report
Before proceeding, indicate on a scale from 0 to 4 how much effort you dedicated to the
preceding task (0 = minimal effort and 4 = maximum effort):
Classification
The computer will now order the scores obtained by each participant on the effort task. The
12 participants with the highest scores will be henceforth called “high performers”, while the
12 participants with the lowest scores will be referred to as “low performers”.
Treatment UE
This session has been assigned to scenario 1. In scenario 1, high performers (B’s) receive
1000 wolfies and low-performers (A’s) receive 300 wolfies. As compensation for the effort
task in phase 1, the computer will credit you with:
• 1000 wolfies for the high performers
• 300 wolfies for the low performers
—OR—
Treatment UI
This session has been assigned to scenario 1. In scenario 1, high performers (B’s) receive 300
wolfies and low-performers (A’s) receive 1000 wolfies.
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As compensation for the effort task in phase 1, the computer will credit you with:
• 300 wolfies for the high performers
• 1000 wolfies for the low performers
—OR—
Treatment EI and EE
This session has been assigned to scenario 1. In scenario 1, high performers (B’s) receive
1000[high]/300[low] wolfies and low-performers (A’s) receive 1000[high]/300[low] wolfies.
As compensation for the effort task in phase 1, the computer will credit you with:
• 1000[high]/300[low] wolfies for the high performers
• 1000[high]/300[low] wolfies for the low performers
This amount will be paid to each participant together with the earnings from Phase 2
and 3. Your score in the Phase 1 is among the 12 highest scores. For this reason you are
classified as a high-performer. The computer will assign you 1000/300 wolfies.
—OR—
Your score in the Phase 1 is among the 12 lowest scores. For this reason you are classified
as a low-performer. The computer will assign you 300/1000 wolfies.
Phase 2
For Treatments UE, UI and EE
For this phase, you have now been paired with a partner. Each low-performer which we will
refer to as “A” has been randomly paired with a high-performer, which we will refer to as
“B”. B has been put in charge of an account of 1500 wolfies which belongs to A. B will receive
25 binary signals (RED / GREEN). Each signal is randomly generated by the computer and
each signal red or green has an equal probability of occurring each of the 25 times (thus, it
is like flipping a coin). The random value of each signal is communicated privately to only
B. The green signal means that B is entitled to take 40 wolfies from the A’s account. The
red signal means that B leaves A’s account untouched.
—OR—
For Treatments EE
For this phase, you have now been paired with a partner. Each low[high]-performer which
we will refer to as “A” has been randomly paired with a low[high]-performer, which we will
refer to as “B”. B has been put in charge of an account of 1500 wolfies which belongs to A.
B will receive 25 binary signals (RED / GREEN). Each signal is randomly generated by the
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computer and each signal red or green has an equal probability of occurring each of the 25
times (thus, it is like flipping a coin). The random value of each signal is communicated
privately to only B. The green signal means that B is entitled to take 40 wolfies from the
A’s account. The red signal means that B leaves A’s account untouched.
The total number of red and green signals reported by B will be announced to A at the
end of phase 2, together with the net amount of his or her account.
What ultimately matters for the actual transfer of payments from the account as well
as what is communicated to each A, are the signals as reported the B partner of each A: in
other words, if B registers a signal different from that generated by the computer, whether
money is transferred from A’s account to B’s account is determined by the reported signal,
not the computer-generated signal. Once B has recorded a signal, its value can no longer be
changed.
At the end of this phase, each A subject will receive the amount of the original account
(1000 wolfies) less the number of green signals reported by their partner times 60 (because
60 wolfies is lost with the reporting of each green signal). A’s must wait for their partners
to receive and report all 25 signals. During this time each A will be asked to predict the
number of green signals that they expect their partner to report.
Test Rounds
Before we begin Phase 2 each of you will assume the role of B for 4 practice rounds.
These practice rounds are for illustrative purposes only and thus do not affect final
earnings.
In each round will receive a signal, red or green, and then you will be asked to report the
signal. The computer will then display the hypothetical effects of the reported signal on the
earnings of each partner.
Explanation
In this round of testing you have received a red signal. We have asked you to record the signal
incorrectly as green. As a result, if you were B you would have transferred 40 wolfies from
A’s account into your account. This is because the transfer is determined by the reported
signal rather than the signal that was generated by the computer.
Assignment to Scenarios
This session has been assigned to scenario 3. In scenario 1, high performers (B’s) receive
1000 (300) wolfies and low-performers (A’s) receive 1000 (300) wolfies.
This session has been assigned to scenario 4. In scenario 2, high performers (B’s) receive
1000 (300) wolfies and low-performers (A’s) receive 1000 (300) wolfies.
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Assigning the role of low-performer or high-performer
The computer has now assigned your roles and partners for this session Your performance
ranking classifies you as a low-performer and therefore you will play the role of A. For this
reason, you are the owner of the account with 1000 wolfies. You have been randomly matched
to a participant whose performance classifies him or her as a high-performer, and thus will
play the role of B. Your partner will administer your 1000-wolfie account based on the values
reported after observing the series of randomly generated signals. During this stage, your
only task is to predict the number of green signals you expect to be recorded by your partner.
(Remember that each of the two signals is equally likely to occur each time, therefore the
process is similar to flipping a coin 25 times.) Recall that because of the scenario you were
selected to be in and your status as a low-performer you will receive 200 (700) wolfies in
addition to the amount determined by the reporting of the signals in this phase.
—OR—
The computer has now assigned your roles and partners for this session. Your performance
ranking classifies you as a high-performer and therefore you will play the role of B. You have
been randomly matched with a low-performer, who will be designated as player A. You will
administer the 1000-wolfie account owned by A. You will receive a series of 25 binary signals,
your recording of which will determine whether a transfer from your partner’s account to
your account takes place. Recall that because of the scenario you were selected to be in and
your status as a high-performer you will receive 700 (200) wolfies in addition to the amount
determined by the reporting of the signals in this phase.
Phase 3
Phase 2 is completed. Before showing you the results, we ask you to complete a task identical
to the one you completed in Phase 1. You will be shown a new text in a foreign language and
you have to record on each line the number of times the letters “c” and “e” appear. Again,
you have 5 minutes to do this exercise. Once the time expires, you will receive a payment
on the basis of correct answers. For each correct count, you will receive 10 wolfies.
Effort Report
Before proceeding, once again indicate on a scale from 0 to 4 how much effort you dedicated
to the preceding task (0 = minimal effort and 4 = maximum effort).
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